

**PROPOSALS CONCERNING POW/MIA
ISSUES FROM ANCIENT WARS
VIETNAM-KOREA-WORLD WAR II**

This report has the support of:

World War II Families for the Return of the Missing

National Alliance of Families

Korea War Families

Korean War Veterans Association

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SUMMARY

The object of this report is to enlist support for new ideas and establish goals for the purpose of expediting the recovery and identification of deceased military Prisoners of War and Missing in Action Servicemen from ancient wars. The report presents a historical perspective and background information upon which these goals were formulated.

This report is the result of nine years of working as a volunteer at the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC), Hickam AFB, Hawaii. In 1999 and 2001 I was fortunate to be able to accompany Search and Recovery Teams to Korea in search of MIA Marines I served with.

After returning from Korea in 2001 I had some ideas that I thought might help to improve our governments POW/MIA Programs. In 2001 Congressman Doug Ose formed a MIA Task Force charged with reviewing the recovery and identification efforts of these agencies to determine how they can be improved, and if they would be more efficient if they were consolidated. As a task force member, I traveled to DPMO and JPAC several times at my own expense to meet with staff members. Suggestions for improvement were presented in 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007, and 2008.

The National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific (Punchbowl) has 857 Unknowns interred from the Korean War. Six of the Unknowns have been identified. Recent research has twenty-three additional Unknowns as possible association to MIA's. A shortage of forensic anthropologists at JPAC has delayed the process. To put this in perspective, there have been 126 identifications of Korean War MIA's in the last 56 years.

It is recognized that each of the goals presents a challenge, but with a backlog of thousands of remains yet to be recovered and identified, the present system must be streamlined to improve efficiency and cost effectiveness.

SUMMARY

The biggest obstacle encountered so far is the policy decision set forth by the Defense POW/MIA Personnel Office (DPMO) known as the Most Recent War First Policy. This policy, which has neither been endorsed nor proposed by Congress or the Department of Defense, allocates 75% - 80% of available resources into SEA.

1. Re-organize DPMO by appointing a career government employee, familiar with the POW/MIA Mission, as Director of DPMO with authority to establish centralized management for all agencies in recovery and identification efforts for ancient wars.
2. Department of Defense prepare a Recent Needs Assessment for DPMO and JPAC requested by Government Accountability Office in August 2005.
3. Re-locate the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) from Hickam AFB, Hawaii, to the Mainland. JPAC forensic anthropologists would be more effective located near other government forensic assets. Current plans are to build a new JPAC facility in Hawaii at an estimated cost of 111 million.
4. Achieve parity in Team Assignments for recovery operations for ancient wars in place of the current policy which places 75% of effort and funding to Southeast Asia.
5. Establish a centralized Outreach Program for Family Reference Samples (mtDNA) within DPMO or JPAC. The Service Casualty Offices do not have the resources to effectively perform this task.
6. Develop a Specific Plan for archival research for ancient wars by a professional historian. Locate historians and analysts for DPMO and JPAC at a location close to the National Archives under one roof for closer working relationships.
7. Establish JPAC detachments in Europe and South Korea to work with foreign governments in the recovery and identification of America's MIA's.

SUMMARY

8. Provide Direct Funding by the Department of Defense to DPMO for all organizations working to recover and identify America's Missing from ancient wars.

When negotiations resume with North Korea, the United States should insist that JPAC Teams be allowed to investigate former United Nations Cemeteries. For example, known burial grounds in North Korea that have not been adequately explored include:

<u>U.N. Military Cemetery</u>	<u>Men Not Returned</u>	
Pyongyang	59	(Several rows not completely excavated)
Yudam-ni	17	(Mass burial site)
Hungnam # 1	2	(Last row in cemetery not excavated)
Hungnam # 2	40	(No remains returned)
Koto-ri # 2	11	(Mass burial site)
Wonsan	3	(Last row in cemetery not excavated)
POW Camps	2464	
Total	2596	

I am convinced recoveries and identifications can be increased significantly by adopting all or some the recommendations in this report.

RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSE POW/MIA PERSONNEL OFFICE

(DPMO)

Since its inception, DPMO's mission has expanded from initially accounting primarily for missing personnel from the Vietnam War to missing personnel from ancient wars World War II and Korea.

Recoveries and identifications have not kept pace with advances in technology and scientific discoveries. The organization that exists is not capable of assuming this larger mission.

Policy developed in the early years of DMPO for the most part has not changed. Since 2004, 65% of recoveries and identifications are from World War II and Korea, yet 75% of mission scheduling and funding is devoted to Southeast Asia


Increased need for forensic anthropologists, historians, and odontologists has not been met. As a consequence, forensic anthropologists on staff can only spend 17% of their time in the laboratory on identifications. **(Time Allocation graph attached.)**

PROPOSED SOLUTION

1. Establish DPMO as the single authority for all matters relating to recovery and identification of our missing American Servicemen for ancients wars.
2. Appoint a career government employee, familiar with the POW/MIA Mission, as Director of DPMO.
3. The location of DPMO should remain in the D.C. for Department of Defense and Congressional oversight.

It is my belief that the Secretary of Defense can make the needed changes in organization which will help make our government's POW/MIA Programs more effective and less costly.

Time Allocation of Forensic Anthropologists



MAINLAND LOCATION FOR THE JOINT POW/MIA ACCOUNTING COMMAND

JPAC is located at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii. The Air Force needs the space occupied by JPAC. The new building planned for construction will cost 111 million dollars. Locating JPAC on the Mainland has many long term benefits and will lower needed funding for MIA programs.

1. The Central Identification Laboratory at JPAC should be a first responder to national disasters.
2. Archival research for ancient wars will be more productive close to the National Archives and researchers for both DPMO and JPAC could be housed under one roof for closer cooperation.
3. **Retention and recruitment of forensic anthropologists and professional historians would be enhanced. The turnover of scientific personnel at JPAC is high which lengthens the identification process.**
4. Staff time lost to travel, costs of travel, and expenses related to travel would be reduced.
5. There would be better access by family members of MIA's to JPAC personnel. When an identification is made at JPAC, a family member is flown to JPAC to escort the identified serviceman back to the Mainland.
6. JPAC could be merged with DPMO so there is a single Department of Defense representative and point of contact for all organizations involved in our government's POW/MIA Programs. The fiscal year 2005 National Defense Authorization Act required that the United States Accountability Office review the missions, staffing, and funding of DPMO. DPMO's strategic plan, issued in

MAINLAND LOCATION FOR THE JOINT POW/MIA ACCOUNTING COMMAND

January 2005, specified a goal of implementing an organizational structure that would unify government missing personnel accounting efforts.

7. DPMO's original mission was to provide centralized management of prisoner of war/missing in action affairs throughout the Department of Defense. With JPAC located 5,000 miles distant under the control of the Pacific Command, it makes it very difficult for DPMO to provide centralized management for POW/MIA Affairs.
8. Existing vacant government facilities closer to DPMO, the National Archives, and the Armed Forces Identification Laboratory (AFDIL) would reduce needed funding.
9. Recently a meeting was held in Atlanta, Georgia to consider combining Department of Defense forensic assets to a single location. Sites considered are Atlanta, Georgia, Quantico, Virginia, and Rockville, Maryland.
10. During fiscal year 2007, JPAC obtained a building from the U.S. Navy at Pearl Harbor Naval Base. The building is being remodeled and currently houses the J-1 Section of JPAC. The only cost to JPAC is for the remodel and use of utilities. This 20,000 square foot building could be used to house a JPAC Operational Detachment for recoveries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. The 111 million allocated for a new JPAC structure in Hawaii could be used to house the Central Identification Laboratory close to the Armed Forces Identification Laboratories in Rockville, Maryland.

Building acquired by JPAC from U.S. Navy at Pearl Harbor Naval Station



NEW PLAN FOR ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

Current DPMO policy for the Mission Scheduling is called the 10-5-10 Plan.

Southeast Asia:	10 Missions	
Worldwide Missions:	10 Missions	(Includes South Korea)
North Korea:	5 Missions	(When allowed in North Korea)

Theoretically this would mean 40% of Mission budgeting would be for Southeast Asia, 40% for Worldwide Mission, and 20% for North Korea. Mission allotment for research and mission scheduling ***has never followed the 10-5-10 Plan.***

Team assignments for Southeast Asia is approximately 75% of teams in the field. Team assignments for Worldwide Missions is approximately 20% of teams in the field. Team assignments for North Korea is approximately 5% of teams in the field, when teams are allowed in North Korea.

There is a need to develop a plan to increase recoveries and identifications. A

starting point would be to allocate resources as follows:

Southeast Asia:	33%
Worldwide Missions:	34%
Korea:	33%

Re-assignment of personnel to meet this goal will take time which may result in less team missions in the field for the short term.

The current practice of bringing in new personnel, both military and civilian with little or no training in archival research is ineffective and a waste of human resources.

The 2008 JPAC Operation Plan places the majority of Team Assignments in Southeast Asia regardless of the fact that 65% of recoveries and identifications are from World War II and Korea since 2004.

NEW PLAN FOR ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

<u>Identifications 2004 through 2008</u>	<u>375</u>	
Southeast Asia	132	35%
World War II	161	43%
Korea	82	22%

<u>JPAC Mission Schedule 2008</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>69</u>
Southeast Asia	44	64%
World War II*	20	29%
Korea	5	7%

*The 2008 JPAC Operation plan mentions 22 missions to World War II sites, but 6 of those missions are tentative.

<u>JPAC Mission Schedule 2008 Team Days</u>	<u>1944</u>	
Southeast Asia	1391	71%
World War II	463	24%
Korea	90	5%

Of the total 375 Identifications 2004 through 2008, **58 or 16% were from World War II site Papua New Guinea, yet the 2008 JPAC Operation Plan sent only 1 Recovery Team to Papua New Guinea.**

TEAMS DEPLOYED AND IDENTIFICATIONS SINCE 2004

Please refer to following tables for Team Assignments and Identifications:

<u>Teams Deployed 2004</u>			<u>Identifications 2004</u>		
	72			60	
Southeast Asia	51	71%	Southeast Asia	29	48%
Worldwide	11	15%	World War II	21	36%
North Korea	10	14%	Korea	10	16%

<u>Teams Deployed 2005</u>			<u>Identifications 2005</u>		
	67			88	
Southeast Asia	54	81%	Southeast Asia	31	35%
Worldwide	11	16%	World War II	47	54%
North Korea	2	3%	Korea	10	11%

<u>Teams Deployed 2006</u>			<u>Identifications 2006</u>		
	59			92	
Southeast Asia	45	76%	Southeast Asia	29	32%
Worldwide	8	14%	World War II	43	47%
Korea	6	10%	Korea	20	21%

<u>Teams Deployed 2007</u>			<u>Identifications 2007</u>		
	46			67	
Southeast Asia	35	76%	Southeast Asia	20	30%
Worldwide	8	17%	World War II	24	36%
Korea	3	7%	Korea	23	34%

<u>Teams Deployed 2008</u>			<u>Identifications 2008</u>		
	69			68	
Southeast Asia	44	64%	Southeast Asia	23	34%
Worldwide	20	29%	World War II	26	38%
South Korea	5	7%	Korea	19	28%

OUTREACH FOR FAMILY REFERENCE SAMPLES (FRS)

1. *The Defense Science Board Report of 1995 recommended that outreach for FRS for ancient wars be conducted within the DPMO structure.* The recommendation was not accepted.
2. Currently outreach for FRS is conducted by the Service Casualty Offices. The peak year for obtaining FRS was 2001 and has been declining each year. The Service Casualty Offices do not have the resources to conduct an effective outreach program. The average time it takes for the Services to respond to a request from JPAC is 490 days and growing.

When a family of a MIA declines to give a FRS, the Services will not pursue additional family members. On many occasions JPAC has found a family member which resulted in identifications. The position of the Services is understandable for they want to remain in good graces with the family. However OUR DUTY IS TO THE MIA, and an organization within JPAC or DPMO to conduct the Outreach Program would be able to find other family members for a FRS.

3. Family Reference Samples are used for both identification and exclusion of remains now at JPAC.
4. Currently there are 1433 Unknown remains at JPAC.
5. The forensic anthropologists at JPAC know the most urgent FRS's needed for cases they are working on. The new Outreach Program Office would be tasked to put those requests as a priority.

ESTABLISH A SPECIFIC PLAN FOR ARCHIVAL RESEARCH FOR ANCIENT WARS

Archival research is the most important function to support teams in the field and in the identification of Unknowns interred in our National Cemeteries.

1. Archival research is done at both DPMO and JPAC. The absence of a Specific Plan for archival research and the separation of 5,000 miles between agencies provides for duplication of effort and a waste of valuable resources.

Researchers at both agencies total approximately 100 staff members. The majority of staff members are analysts with little or no training in archival research.

A Specific Plan for archival research by a professional historian would ensure that historians and analysts are working together.

2. Our military kept excellent records, but finding those records can be very difficult without the knowledge of professional historians who know the process at the National Archives.
3. Research for MIA's from ancient wars should be located at one location, preferably near the National Archives.

For several years the need for professional historians was mentioned to JPAC. In the military organizational structure research is assigned to the J-2 Section. (Intelligence) If research is to remain in the military structure, the J-2 Commander should come from the Military History Department of one of our military academies.

JPAC did hire three professional historians. One of those historians is now in charge of World War II research. The results have been very good; the majority of identifications now come from WW II. A second professional historian was tasked to organize and catalog the Korean War archives at JPAC. When I first went to CILHI (now JPAC) in

ESTABLISH A SPECIFIC PLAN FOR ARCHIVAL RESEARCH FOR ANCIENT WARS

1998, there was minimal organization of the Korean War Archives. In fact most were in boxes.

The professional historian who organized and cataloged the Korean War Archives at JPAC is now a historian in the World Wide Section. The majority of research for the Korean War was done at DPMO, 5,000 miles distant, and seldom used by the previous Korea War Section. Today under the guidance of a professional historian, the DPMO research is now being used on a daily basis.

Previously, very little work had been completed for American losses in South Korea, a friendly country, where estimates for American MIA's range from 1,200 to 2,061. Research for losses in South Korea has started. The majority of men missing in South Korea were from hill battles which are not farmed or built on. American MIA's in North Korea exceed 6,000.

The interviews of former POW's for Korea need to be declassified. Fifty-six years have elapsed since the war ended.

The point here is that both organizations need a Specific Plan for research developed and administered by professional historians.

All archival research should be located under one roof at a location near the National Archives. There is a need for additional professional historians. ***If JPAC were re-located to the Mainland, recruitment and retention of historians would be improved.***

DPMO DETACHMENTS FOR SOUTH KOREA AND EUROPE

Currently there are three foreign detachments, all in Southeast Asia. They are located in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.

Detachment 1, in Thailand, should be closed with a savings of approximately \$894,000 plus the salaries of five military personnel. The resources saved would allow DPMO to staff a forensic anthropologist and needed staff in both South Korea and Europe.

From 2000 through 2008, there have been 661 identifications of American military from Southeast Asia, World War II locations, and Korea.

<u>Identifications: Years 2000 through 2008</u>	<u>685</u>	
Southeast Asia	310	45%
World War II	274	40%
Korea	101	15%

<u>Identifications: Years 2005 through May 2008</u>	<u>315</u>	
Southeast Asia	103	33%
World War II	140	44%
Korea	72	23%

World War II losses in Europe and Korea losses are in need of DPMO Detachments to provide logistical support and on-site personnel to work with foreign governments when JPAC teams are in these countries and to do forensic reviews of remains found in these areas by foreign governments.

The government of South Korea set up a program recently to recover and identify missing people from the Korean War which number close to 100,000. The ROK Program is very active and remains found are cremated when they can not be identified. *In 2006, 66 sets of remains were cremated before JPAC could do a forensic review.*

DPMO DETACHMENTS FOR SOUTH KOREA AND EUROPE

Please refer to **Enclosure 6**, a study by JPAC anthropologists regarding the need for JPAC to have a presence in South Korea.

Three years ago, an idea was presented to JPAC to consider placing a small detachment at the Yongsan U.S. Army Base in Seoul, Korea. During the 50th Anniversary Commemoration of the Korean War, the General Dean Center was constructed at Yongsan. The 8th Army Archives were transferred to this center.

At this time the General Dean Center is staffed by two historians for the United States Forces Korea. *A small JPAC Detachment here could work with the ROK Recovery Program for a forensic review of remains found, provide logistical support for JPAC teams, and be able to visit sites where we have American losses.*

The argument against finding American MIA remains in South Korea is that the country has had too many infrastructure improvements. This is a bogus argument given that most of the losses were in hill battles where American Units were over run or POW's that died or were executed on POW marches in South Korea. *One JPAC Investigative Team in 2007 resulted in 2 recoveries and 11 sites to be excavated in 2008.*

U.S. Army Mortuary Affairs is located close to the General Dean Center and wants to be involved in the United States recovery efforts. In addition, American military in Korea want to be involved in trying to locate our MIA's, but JPAC does not have a presence there to organize and use these valuable American assets.

On 14 May 2007, I met with the Chief Historian for United States Forces Korea, located in the General Dean Center. He said he would welcome a JPAC detachment in Korea. This facility has several vacant offices and is used for storage of kitchen equipment except for their archives library and two offices he occupies. He would have to obtain permission from the Commanding General, U.S. Forces Korea, but felt confident approval for a JPAC office would be approved.

DIRECT FUNDING BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO THE DEFENSE
POW/MISSING PERSONNEL OFFICE (DPMO)

Current policy to fund the organizations working to Recover and Identify America's Prisoners of War and Missing in Action come from several sources. The U.S. Army funds the Armed Forces Identification Laboratory (AFDIL). The U.S. Navy funds the Joint Personnel Accounting Command (JPAC). The U.S. Air Force funds the Life Science Equipment Laboratory (LSEL).

1. Direct funding would ensure that DPMO and its supporting organizations would be fully funded each year.
2. Funding shortages that happened at AFDIL in 2003, 2006, and 2007 resulted in the loss of scientific personnel that had been trained over a period of 18 months. In 2003, new DNA laboratories were closed for lack of personnel.
3. When the funds are provided by a warfighting command, it is natural that the Military Commander will use those funds to support the military under their command. The program to find and identify America's POW's and MIA's is a Humanitarian Government Program.
4. All funds to conduct the operations to find and identify America's Missing In Action from Ancient Wars should be to the Defense POW/Missing personnel Office (DPMO). Programs and activities shall be designed and managed to improve standards of performance, economy, and efficiency".
5. *Direct funding by DOD to DMPO would be less complicated, more effective, and ensure that planned missions for Search and Recovery Teams are on schedule.*